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A SOLUTION TO MICHIGAN’S CHILD
SHACKLING PROBLEM
Gabe Newland*

INTRODUCTION
Detained children routinely appear before Michigan’s juvenile courts
shackled with handcuffs, leg irons, and belly chains.1 Once security officers
bring a child to court in these shackles, the child usually remains in them for
her hearing or trial. In Michigan, as in many other states, no statute or court
rule requires the judge to decide whether shackles are necessary.2
This Essay argues that Michigan should pass legislation or amend state
court rules to create a presumption against shackling children. Unless a child
poses a substantial risk of flight or physical danger and less restrictive
alternatives to shackling will not adequately address those risks, the child
should appear in court without shackles.

* J.D., August 2014, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Frank Vandervort,
Kim Thomas, Eve Brensike Primus, Alec Karakatsanis, James MacLeod, Eva Foti, and Guy
Newland for inspiration and helpful comments. Thanks also to David Shapiro and my editors,
Matthew McCurdy and Brian Tengel. I dedicate this Essay to my mother, the late Dr. Valerie
Stephens, who overcame a childhood of poverty and abuse and devoted her life to helping
others do the same.
1. I frequently saw shackled children in Washtenaw County Trial Court when I was a
student attorney in the University of Michigan Law School’s Juvenile Justice Clinic. Local
attorneys confirm routine child shackling across the state. Email from Frank Vandervort,
Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., to Gabe Newland (May 15, 2014, 12:26 PM)
(on file with author) (Genesee County); Email from Nichole Smithson, Attorney, N.L.
Smithson & Assocs. PLLC, to Frank Vandervort (Apr. 9, 2014, 8:42 PM) (on file with author)
(Oakland County); Email from Susan Murphy, Referee, Jackson Cnty. Family Court, to Frank
Vandervort (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:22 AM) (on file with author) (Jackson County); Email from Eric
Scott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Sanilac Cnty., to Frank Vandervort (Apr. 10, 2014, 9:11
AM) (on file with author) (Sanilac County).
2. Kim M. McLaurin, Children in Chains: Indiscriminate Shackling of Juveniles, 38
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 213, 232 n.119 (2012) (explaining that “no judicial decision, written
procedural rule, written court policy, or legislation” prohibits indiscriminate shackling in
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, or the District
of Columbia).
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There are many good reasons to adopt such a presumption. First,
Michigan’s current practice serves little purpose: judges can keep
courtrooms safe without indiscriminate shackling. Second, shackles flout the
rehabilitative goals of juvenile court by humiliating and traumatizing
children. Third, shackles cause constitutional harm. They interfere with
attorney–client communications, offend the dignity of the judicial process,
and erode the presumption of innocence, thus undermining the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finally, not
a single state legislature or appellate court has endorsed indiscriminate child
shackling, and a growing number of states reject the practice.
I. COURTROOM SECURITY
Some support indiscriminate child shackling by arguing that it is
necessary “to ensure that security is maintained in the courtroom.”3 And
given the high tension and potential for violence in courtrooms across the
country,4 security is indeed an important concern. But indiscriminate child
shackling does not obviously improve courtroom security; both logic and
experience suggest that courtrooms would remain safe with a presumption
against shackling.
First, a presumption is not a blanket ban. It simply changes the default,
asking the judge to articulate a reason for shackling. Does the child’s
behavior create a substantial risk of flight? Does her behavior create a
substantial risk of physical danger? And, crucially, will the presence of
bailiffs or other courtroom employees address those risks? If not, the judge
may shackle.
Second, juvenile courts outside Michigan have adopted similar rules
without experiencing spikes in courtroom violence. In Miami–Dade County,
for example, “more than 20,000 detained children have appeared before the
court unbound” since 2006, when the county adopted a presumption against
shackling.5 Once during that time, a boy “started for the exit of the
courtroom” before a public defender stopped him.6 And yet “no child has

3. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d 552, 559
(Fla. 2009) (Canady, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Defendant Killed by Court Officer at Utah Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/defendant-killedby-court-officer-at-utah-trial.html.
5. CARLOS J. MARTINEZ, LAW OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 11TH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, UNCHAIN THE CHILDREN: FIVE YEARS LATER IN FLORIDA 1 (2011),
available
at
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/Shackling_Update_December_2011.pdf.
6. Id. at 6.
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harmed anyone or escaped from court.”7 On the other side of the country, a
pilot program to reduce shackling in Nevada’s most populous county reveals
similar results. “[T]here has not been an increase in courtroom violence,”
confirmed Brigid Duffy, Clark County’s chief juvenile prosecutor.8 Duffy
explained that, after two years, the program has satisfied “office concerns for
the safety of victims, witnesses and prosecutors;” she plans to work with
other county agencies “to develop a more formalized policy and procedure.”9
East of Nevada, Boulder provides yet another example. The Colorado county
has “not had any problems” since adopting a presumption against shackling
earlier this year.10 According to chief juvenile prosecutor Peggy Jessel,
Boulder has “not deemed anyone to need the restraints,” and there have been
“no incidents in the courtroom.”11
II. THE REHABILITATIVE PURPOSE OF JUVENILE COURTS
More than forty years ago, in Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that juvenile courts are supposed “to provide measures of
guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”12 In the years since Kent, the
developmental differences between children and adults have continued to
shape our legal system. J.D.B. v. North Carolina held that age matters when
determining whether a child is in “custody” according to Miranda v.
Arizona;13 Roper v. Simmons banned the death penalty for children under
eighteen;14 Graham v. Florida prohibited life-without-parole sentences for
children under eighteen convicted of nonhomicide offenses;15 and Miller v.
Alabama “combined” Roper and Graham to prohibit mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for children under eighteen.16 The rationale
guiding these holdings—children’s relative lack of maturity, limited ability to
consider the consequences of their actions, and increased capacity to reform
their behavior—provides the foundation for juvenile justice.

7. Id. at 1.
8. Email from Brigid Duffy, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, Juvenile Div., Clark Cnty.
Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Gabe Newland (July 15, 2014, 3:14 PM) (on file with author).
9. Id.
10. Email from Lisa A. Polansky, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, to Gabe Newland
(Mar. 13, 2014, 6:02 PM) (on file with author).
11. Email from Peggy Jessel, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, 20th Judicial Dist. Juvenile
Div., to Gabe Newland (June 27, 2014, 12:08 PM) (on file with author).
12. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
13. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398–99 (2011).
14. 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578–79 (2005), rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
15. 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010).
16. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
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The statute that establishes Michigan’s juvenile justice system echoes
Kent. It focuses on the “care” and “guidance” of “each juvenile coming
within the court’s jurisdiction.”17 Under the statute, hearings and trials in
juvenile court “are not criminal proceedings;”18 when “a juvenile is removed
from the control of his or her parents, the juvenile shall be placed in care as
nearly as possible equivalent to the care that should have been given to the
juvenile by his or her parents.”19 Consistent with the rehabilitative language
defining juvenile justice in Michigan, juvenile courts typically strive to
“protect children” and “increase the competencies of court-involved
youth.”20
And yet shackles work against these rehabilitative goals. They humiliate
and traumatize kids. Dr. Marty Beyer, a psychologist and nationally
renowned adolescent-development expert, submitted an affidavit to Florida
courts during the state’s successful shackling reform. According to Dr. Beyer,
shackles are “physically painful” and “humiliating.”21 Because children are
“[i]n the midst of their identity and moral development,”22 shackles “may
solidify adolescents’ alienation, send mixed messages about the purpose of
the justice system, and confirm their belief that they are bad.”23
“Children and adolescents,” Dr. Beyer explained, “are more vulnerable
to lasting harm from feeling humiliation and shame than adults.”24 Children
lack the cognitive and emotional maturity to recognize the difference
between a blanket shackling policy and personal punishment.25 And because
children are relatively immature, “their reaction to the unfairness of being
shackled may preoccupy them, interfering with their paying attention to
what the judge says in the courtroom.”26 Shackles are particularly harmful to

17. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1(3) (West 2012).
18. Id. § 712A.1(2).
19. Id. § 712A.1(3).
20. E.g., Mission & Vision Statements, Washtenaw County Trial Court, Juvenile Court,
http://washtenawtrialcourt.org/juvenile (last visited June 29, 2014).
21. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer ¶¶ 10, 20, In re R.C., No. 2006-CJ-004506 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
23, 2006), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/AppendixDBeyer.pdf.
22. Id. ¶ 17.
23. Id. According to one child, “I was so worried about how everyone was seeing me in
shackles that I couldn’t concentrate because it made me feel like a monster. I felt unfairly
treated. I was unable to focus.” Letter from Christian Ordonez-Henderson to Justice Charles
Johnson, Chair, Wash. State Supreme Court Rules Comm. (Apr. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2014Feb/JuCR1.6/Christian%20OrdonezHenderson.pdf.
24. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer, supra note 21, ¶ 10.
25. Id. ¶ 14.
26. Id.
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children of color, who may experience this public degradation as racism,
“which is extremely harmful to the development of a positive identity.”27
Many children in juvenile court “have experienced severe trauma,
including the death of family members, physical and sexual abuse, exposure
to domestic and street violence, and school failure due to learning
disabilities.”28 According to Dr. Beyer, shackles can delay recovery and
retraumatize children by causing them to “feel once again that they cannot
control hurtful things that happen to them.”29 Shackles may also “provoke in
a traumatized young person a combination of self-blame and sense of
betrayal that can lead to self-destructiveness or aggression.”30
Given these harmful consequences, Dr. Beyer concluded that “[p]hysical
restraints should not be a routine practice with children and adolescents.”31
Instead, shackles “should be limited to rare situations when a young person
poses an imminent threat to others’ safety.”32
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Shackles undermine the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
because they interfere with attorney–client communications, offend the
dignity of the judicial process, and erode the presumption of innocence.
“[L]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”33 In Deck v.
Missouri, the Supreme Court held that due process “does not permit the use
of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken account of the
circumstances of the particular case.”34 Before shackling a defendant during
“the guilt phase of a criminal trial”35 or during “penalty proceedings in
capital cases,”36 the trial court must first determine whether shackles “are

27. Id. ¶ 12.
28. Id. ¶ 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. ¶ 7.
32. Id.
33. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone.”).
34. 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005); accord People v. Dunn, 521 N.W.2d 255, 262 (Mich. 1994)
(“[A] defendant may be shackled only on a finding supported by record evidence that this is
necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom or to maintain order.”).
35. Deck, 544 U.S. at 632.
36. Id.
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justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.”37 In Deck, a jury
convicted Carman Deck of capital murder for robbing and killing an elderly
couple, but the Court held that Deck’s conviction was not enough to justify
shackles during the penalty phase.38 The trial judge did not consider the “risk
of escape,”39 the Court explained, nor did he adequately consider whether
Deck posed “a threat to courtroom security.”40
Although Deck did not decide whether the Constitution prohibits
indiscriminate shackling outside the presence of a jury, the Court’s rationale
suggests that it does. The negative effects of shackling on “three fundamental
legal principles”—the right to counsel, the dignity of the judicial process, and
the presumption of innocence—motivated the Court’s conclusion that due
process prohibits indiscriminate shackling during the guilt phase.41 When a
judge begins a child’s hearing or trial without first considering whether
shackles are necessary, she offends each of these fundamental legal
principles—jurors or no jurors.
First, shackling “diminishes” the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.42 It “interfere[s] with [his] ability to participate in his own
defense . . . by freely choosing whether to take the witness stand.”43
Furthermore, “[s]hackles can interfere with the accused’s ability to
communicate with his lawyer.”44 Neither of these concerns evaporates when
jurors leave the courtroom.45 Children often need to testify at bench trials
and pretrial hearings, and they always need to communicate with counsel.
Indeed, children often have a greater need than adults to communicate

37. Id. at 629.
38. Id. at 624, 634.
39. Id. at 634.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 630–32.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id.
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). According to one child, “[t]alking to my
attorney shackled was a hassle because it was hard for me to sign papers with waist chains and
cuffs. It was a distraction because I was nervous and was tapping my foot the whole time.
When speaking with my attorney I didn’t feel trusted.” Letter from Colin Castenada to Justice
Charles Johnson, Chair, Wash. State Supreme Court Rules Comm. (Apr. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2014Feb/JuCR1.6/Colin%20Castenada.pdf.
45. E.g., United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Even if the
physical restraints placed upon the defendant are not visible to the jury, they still may burden
several aspects of a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); id. (“[L]eg shackles ‘may confuse the
defendant, impair his ability to confer with counsel, and significantly affect the trial strategy he
chooses to follow.’ ” (quoting Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983))).
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effectively with counsel because children are less mature and therefore less
likely to understand the complicated events unfolding before them.46
Second, shackles offend the dignity of the judicial process.47 That dignity
“includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of
the matter at issue . . . and the gravity with which Americans consider any
deprivation of an individual’s liberty through criminal punishment.”48
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he routine use of shackles in the
presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet concrete
objectives.”49 But the danger that shackles will “have a significant effect on
the jury’s feelings about the defendant” is not the only problem.50 As the
Court explained in Illinois v. Allen, “the use of this technique is itself
something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”51
Finally, “[v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence
and the related fairness of the factfinding process.”52 It is “inherently
prejudicial.”53 As the Michigan Supreme Court explained in People v. Dunn,
“[t]he presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence.”54 And
because the presumption of innocence does not vanish when jurors leave the
courtroom, the prejudice lingers. Witnesses, probation officers, and judges
are human. Like jurors, they have strong subconscious biases.55 In the same
way that shackles affect jurors, shackles subtly influence juvenile court
judges. Is there probable cause?56 Should a child remain detained pending
trial?57 Did the child commit the offense alleged in the petition?58 If so, how

46. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
47. Deck, 544 U.S at 631.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Deck, 544 U.S. at 628. According to one child, “I felt that I was already convicted as
guilty in my case because appearing in shackles in court I got degrading looks from other
people in court. I also feel that judge thought of me as a troubled teenager because I was in
shackles.” Letter from Colin Castenada to Justice Charles Johnson, supra note 44.
53. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)).
54. 521 N.W.2d 255, 262 n.26 (Mich. 1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Eaddy v.
People, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (Colo. 1946)).
55. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Kreiger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 956–61 (2006) (explaining implicit bias and
describing the “substantial” evidence “that implicit attitudes produce discriminatory
behavior”).
56. MICH. CT. R. 3.935(D)(1) (2008).
57. MICH. CT. R. 3.935(C)–(D).
58. MICH. CT. R. 3.942.
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should adjudication affect the child’s liberty?59 Shackles influence a judge’s
decision about each of these important questions. Although judges may be
less vulnerable than juries to the prejudicial effect of shackles, judges also
exhibit subconscious biases that affect their decisions.60
IV. THE NATIONWIDE TREND
Not a single legislature or appellate court has endorsed indiscriminate
child shackling, and more than a dozen states reject the practice. In other
states, like Colorado61 and Nevada,62 judges in multiple county trial courts
prohibit indiscriminate shackling despite the absence of a statewide rule. In
every state where indiscriminate shackling remains, it remains because of
inertia, not reason or necessity.
The trend away from child shackling began with In re Staley.63 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that, unless the record “established clearly” that
a child “may try to escape” or “pose a threat to the safety of people in the
courtroom” or that shackles were “necessary to maintain order during the
trial,” a child “cannot be tried in shackles whether there is to be a bench trial
or a trial by jury.”64 Poor courtroom security did not justify handcuffs.65
Several years after this Illinois decision, an appellate court in Oregon
rejected indiscriminate child shackling.66 More recently, appellate courts in
California,67 Florida,68 North Dakota,69 and Washington70 joined the chorus.

59. MICH. CT. R. 3.943.
60. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (confirming that judges harbor implicit racial biases).
61. Boulder County Eliminates the Practice of Indiscriminate Shackling of Juveniles
During
Court
Proceedings,
BOULDER
CNTY.
(Mar.
20,
2014),
http://www.bouldercounty.org/apps/newsroom/templates/bc12.aspx?articleid=3975&zoneid=
1. Boulder is the second county in Colorado to eliminate indiscriminate child shackling. CTR.
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, PROHIBITION OF INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING IN COLORADO JUVENILE
COURTS
2–3,
available
at
http://www.centerforjuvenilejustice.org/images/Shackling_Factsheet_CJJ_.pdf.
62. Colleen McCarty, I-Team: Shackles Coming Off Juveniles in Court, 8NEWSNOW.COM
(Nov. 1, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/19979410/i-team-shackles-comingoff-juveniles-in-court (reporting that Clark County, Nevada, which is in the process of ending
indiscriminate child shackling, is the only county in Nevada that “still chains its children”).
63. 364 N.E.2d 72, 73–74 (Ill. 1977).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 74.
66. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860 (Or.
Ct. App. 1995).
67. Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1344, 1359 (2007).
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In Florida, for example, the highest court approved a statewide court rule
creating a presumption against shackling children; the court described
shackles as “repugnant, degrading, humiliating, and contrary to the stated
primary purposes of the juvenile justice system.”71 The Miami Herald
praised the court for making “the right call in ending this humiliating
practice.”72
In North Carolina, where the state legislature created a presumption
against shackling, “the judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in
the courtroom only when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably
necessary to maintain order, prevent the juvenile’s escape, or provide for the
safety of the courtroom.”73 Connecticut’s judiciary adopted a similar
presumption,74 and in New York the State Office of Children and Family
Services “prohibits the use of shackles during the transportation of any youth
in state custody—including those held at secure facilities, most of whom
have committed more serious crimes—to and from court appearances.”75
In the last four years, Massachusetts,76 New Mexico,77 and
Pennsylvania78 amended court rules to create a presumption against
shackling. In Pennsylvania, for example, the Supreme Court adopted Rule
139, which requires courts to remove shackles unless a judge first determines
68. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d 552, 556–57
(Fla. 2009).
69. In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007).
70. State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
71. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d at 556.
72. Editorial, Court Made Right Call in Limiting Juvenile Shackles, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 28, 2009, at A14.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2402.1 (LexisNexis 2014).
74. Judiciary Comm. Public Hearing, House Bill 7406, An Act Concerning Youthful
Offenders, Delinquent Children and Drug-Free Zones (Conn. 2007) (testimony of Judge
William J. Lavery, Chief Court Administrator for the Connecticut Judicial Branch), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/JUDdata/Tmy/2007HB-07406-R000404CT%20Judicial%20Branch,%20Judge%20William%20J.%20Lavery-TMY.PDF (“On March 15,
2007 the Judicial Branch instituted a new shackling policy for juveniles, which is consistent
with emerging state and federal law around the country to allow juveniles to attend court
unshackled whenever possible . . . .”). According to the Director of Delinquency Defense and
Child Protection at Connecticut’s Office of the Chief Public Defender, however, the policy still
“results in most kids being shackled in court.” Email from Christine Perra Rapillo to Gabe
Newland (June 27, 2014, 2:18 PM) (on file with author).
75. Nicholas Confessore, Officials Bar Shackling of Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2010, at A28 (citing internal memorandum from the New York Office of Children and
Family Services), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/nyregion/04juvenile.html.
76. TRIAL CT. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, CT. OFFICER POLICY AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL, Ch. 4, § VI (2010).
77. N.M CHILDREN’S CT. 10-223A(B) (2014).
78. PA. R. JUVENILE CRIM. P. 139, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (West 2013).
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that they are necessary to prevent physical harm, disruptive courtroom
behavior, or flight.79 Pennsylvania later passed nearly identical legislation.80
Finally, South Carolina81 and Washington82 each adopted a robust
presumption against shackling earlier this year. Republican State Senator
Michael Fair introduced the legislation creating South Carolina’s
presumption, which the Republican-controlled General Assembly passed
unanimously and the Republican Governor Nikki Haley signed into law.83
Like Washington’s new court rule, the South Carolina law presents the
juvenile judge with two questions: (1) Is “the use of restraints necessary,”
perhaps because “the juvenile poses a threat of serious harm to himself or
others”?84 (2) Will “less restrictive alternatives,” like the presence of “court
personnel” or “bailiffs,” obviate the need for shackles?85 Although some
states do not ask the second question,86 posing both questions creates a
stronger rule that better protects children.
CONCLUSION
Michigan should follow South Carolina and the growing number of
states that have passed legislation or amended court rules to create a
presumption against shackling children. Unless a child poses a substantial
risk of flight or physical danger and less restrictive alternatives to shackling
will not adequately address those risks, the child should appear in court
without shackles. Such a policy would keep courtrooms safe, avoid
constitutional problems, and advance the rehabilitative goals of juvenile
court.

79. Id.
80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336.2 (West 2013).
81. S.C. Act 186, 120th session (2014) (to be codified at S.C. CODE § 63-19-1435(A)(2)).
82. Order in the Matter of the Adoption of Amendments to JuCR 1.6, No. 25700-A1067
(Wash.
2014),
available
at
http://www.defensenet.org/news/WA%20Supreme%20Court%20Order%20re%20Juvenile%20
Shackling%20-%2025700-A-1067.pdf.
83. A186, R209, S440 Status Information, SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (June
10, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess120_2013-2014/bills/440.htm.
84. S.C. Act 186, 120th session (2014) (to be codified at S.C. CODE § 63-19-1435(A)(2)).
85. Id.
86. E.g., PA. R. JUVENILE CRIM. P. 139, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (West 2013)
(Pennsylvania); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2402.1 (LexisNexis 2014) (North Carolina); TRIAL
CT. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, CT. OFFICER POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, Ch. 4, § VI
(2010) (Massachusetts); N.M CHILDREN’S CT. 10-223A(B) (2014) (New Mexico).

